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Emigration and Wages: The EU Enlargement Experiment
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The enlargement of the European Union provides a unique opportunity to study the impact of 
the lifting of migration restrictions on the migrant sending countries. With EU enlargement in 
2004, 1.2 million workers from Eastern Europe emigrated to the UK and Ireland. I use this 
emigration wave to show that emigration significantly changed the wage distribution in the 
sending country, in particular between young and old workers. Using a novel dataset from 
Lithuania, the UK and Ireland for the calibration of a structural model of labor demand, I find 
that over the period of five years emigration increased the wages of young workers by 6%, 
while it had no effect on the wages of old workers. Contrary to the immigration literature, 
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Lifting the barriers to migration can lead to welfare gains of up to 150% of world GDP.1 A large
literature has quantiﬁed the gains from migration for the receiving countries and the migrants.
Yet little is known about the impact of emigration on the sending countries. Because migration
is heavily restricted, there are few episodes of large migration waves which can be exploited to
assess the impact of the lifting of these restrictions on the sending countries.2
This paper exploits a large emigration wave from Eastern Europe to analyze the impact of
emigration on the wages of non-migrants in the sending countries. With EU enlargement in 2004,
the UK, Ireland, and Sweden opened their labor markets for workers from Eastern Europe, which
was followed by a migration wave of 1.2 million workers over 3 years. The most-aﬀected sending
countries - Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia - experienced an outﬂow of up to 9% of their
workforce.3
To estimate the wage eﬀects of emigration I use a structural factor demand model (Card &
Lemieux, 2001; Borjas, 2003). I ﬁrst take a snapshot of the labor market before EU enlargement
by estimating the model parameters using microdata from Lithuania. Based on immigration
data from the UK and Ireland I simulate the emigration wave and calculate the wage change,
the diﬀerence between the equilibrium wage before and after the migration wave. This approach
allows me to isolate the eﬀect of emigration from other factors that would otherwise have an
impact on wages, such as trade, FDI, and TFP growth. The methodology also delivers separate
wage eﬀects for groups of workers with diﬀerent education and work experience, allowing for an
assessment of the distributional impact of emigration.
I ﬁnd that emigration had a signiﬁcant impact on the wage structure, particularly on the wage
distribution between old and young workers. It caused a wage increase of 6% for young workers,
while it had no eﬀect on the wages of old workers. By contrast, I ﬁnd no diﬀerence in the wage
eﬀects between high-skilled and low-skilled workers. These wage eﬀects can be decomposed into
an own-wage eﬀect, caused by the emigration of workers with the same observable characteristics,
and general equilibrium eﬀects, caused by the change in the skill distribution of the workforce.
The own-wage eﬀect is positive; a decrease in the number of workers increases their wage. The sum
of the general equilibrium eﬀects, caused by the change in the demographics of the workforce, is
negative. For young workers, who were the majority of emigrants, the own-wage eﬀect dominates,
while for older workers the two eﬀects cancel each other out.
1 Clemens (2011).
2 See Kerr & Kerr (2011) for a review of the immigration literature. Estimates for the gains on the side of the
emigrants can be found in Chiswick (1978), Borjas (1995), and Algan et al. (2010).
3 Own calculations from work permit data. See Figure 1.
2These ﬁndings stress the importance of the labor market externalities in the assessment of the
welfare impacts of emigration. Eastern Europe experienced a large outﬂow of young workers – a
youth drain – from all education levels. Through the price mechanism of the labor market the
wages of young workers increased more than the wages for older workers. Most of the literature
on the sending countries, however, assumes away these labor market eﬀects and focuses instead on
the human capital externalities. In this literature, high-skilled emigration changes the incentives
of non-migrants to invest in education, which can have a negative “brain drain” or a positive “brain
gain” eﬀect (Gibson & McKenzie, 2011; Docquier & Rapoport, 2011) on economic growth. While
indirect eﬀects may be important for developing countries, this paper ﬁnds that the direct wage
eﬀects of emigration play a signiﬁcant role in middle-income countries. The results are therefore
relevant for policymakers in middle-income countries, since candidates for EU membership like
Croatia, Serbia, or Turkey, or Latin American countries have well-educated workforces and may
face a similar emigration wave in the future. This paper shows emigration has a positive eﬀect
on the non-migrants, despite the large outﬂow of workers.
As the emigration wave from Eastern Europe was a sudden shock to labor supply, it allows for
the identiﬁcation of a short-run eﬀect on wages. Moreover, the results have a clear interpretation,
since all migrants left within a short period in time. By contrast, previous studies on the wage
eﬀect of emigration by Mishra (2007) and Aydemir & Borjas (2007) focus on longer time horizons.
Both studies ﬁnd a positive long-run impact in Mexico between 1970 and 2000, but the results
have to be interpreted as if all workers left the economy at once, even though they actually
left gradually over the last 50 years (Hanson & McIntosh, 2010). Recent evidence from quasi-
natural experiments (Elsner, 2010; Gagnon, 2011) shows that emigration increases wages even in
the short run. Both studies, however, use a reduced-form approach, which only allows them to
determine an average eﬀect. In this paper, I show that the these wage eﬀects only beneﬁt the young
workers. Moreover, a comparison with the reduced-form results of Elsner (2010) demonstrates the
importance of the general equilibrium eﬀects, without which the predicted wage changes would
be considerably higher.
Finally, this paper reveals that migration aﬀects sending and receiving countries along diﬀerent
skill dimensions. I ﬁnd a signiﬁcant distributional eﬀect between old and young workers, in
contrast to most studies on immigration, which ﬁnd the main distributional eﬀect between high-
skilled and low-skilled workers (Borjas, 2003; Manacorda et al., 2011; D’Amuri et al., 2010).
The wage eﬀect is larger in Eastern Europe than in the main receiving countries, which can
be explained by the low degree of substitutability between old and young workers in transition
countries. Old workers in Eastern Europe were educated under socialism, while young workers
received their education in a market economy. Therefore, young workers cannot easily be replaced
3by old workers, which results in a stronger reaction of wages on emigration.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a historical overview
and stylized facts about the emigration wave from Eastern Europe after 2004. Section 3 sets up
the structural model. Section 4 describes the data sources, which I use for the estimation of the
structural parameters in Section 5. Section 6 details the simulation of the migration wave and
calculates the wage eﬀects. Section 7 concludes.
2 EU Enlargement, Migration and Wages: Stylized
Facts
In 2004 eight former socialist countries from Central and Eastern Europe joined the EU. For
workers from these countries the high wage diﬀerentials between Western Europe and the accession
countries created a large incentive to emigrate.4 Freedom of Movement, a basic principle of the
EU, guarantees every worker from the New Member States the right to migrate to any EU country
and take up employment. However, only Ireland, the UK and Sweden immediately opened their
labor markets and experienced a large inﬂux of immigrants. Most other countries in Western
Europe were concerned with potential negative consequences for their labor markets and their
welfare systems and restricted the access for workers from the New Member States for up to
7 years. 1.2 million workers migrated between 2004 and 2007 from Eastern Europe to the UK
(770,000), Ireland (416,000) and Sweden (19,000).5
Figure 1 illustrates the magnitude of the emigration wave by comparing the number of em-
igrants to the size of the workforce. Most migrants came from Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and
Slovakia. Although Poland had the highest number of emigrants, Lithuania and Latvia had the
highest share of emigrants. Between 2004 and 2007, 9% of all Lithuanian workers and 6% of all
Latvian workers received a work permit in Ireland or the UK. While some workers only migrated
for a short period, the majority stayed in the destination country for longer periods of time. Ev-
idence from the Irish Central Statistics Oﬃce (2009) suggests that around 60% of migrants from
the New Member States stayed for at least two years after having received a work permit.
This study takes Lithuania as an example to study the impact of emigration on the wages
of stayers. Lithuania makes an interesting case, as it had the highest share of emigrants among
the accession countries. At the same time, the results are externally valid with respect to other
transition countries. Poland, Slovakia and Latvia share the same history of transition as Lithuania
4 The diﬀerence PPP-adjusted GDP per capita, a proxy for wage diﬀerentials, amounted to 37% in Lithuania
and 40% in Poland, compared to the UK. Source: Eurostat.
5 Sources: Ireland: Central Statistics Oﬃce. UK: UK Home Oﬃce. Sweden: Wadensjö (2007).
4Figure 1 – Emigrant Shares in Central and Eastern Europe
Note: This ﬁgure shows the share of emigrants to the UK and Ireland between 2004 and 2007, relative to the total workforce.
Source: Own calculations, based on Irish PPS Numbers, UK National Insurance Numbers (NINo), Eurostat.
since the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1990. In addition, they were in a similar economic situation
at the time of EU enlargement, with comparable levels of GDP per capita and unemployment.6
An outﬂow of 9% of the workforce should therefore have similar impacts on the wage structure in
all four countries.
The number of work permits per year issued to Lithuanian workers increased sharply from
6,400 in 2003 to 40,000 in 2006.7 Around the same time Lithuania experienced a phase of high
economic growth. Between 2002 and 2006, the GDP per capita grew in total by 37.5%. The high
growth was also accompanied by a phase of considerable wage increases. The graph on the left in
Figure 2 shows the changes in average real wages for workers in diﬀerent education and experience
groups.
Although all groups gained, the wage changes were not spread evenly across groups of workers.
Young workers with a work experience of up to 20 years gained considerably more than old workers
with less than 20 years of work experience. In addition, workers with an education level below
third-level degree experienced higher wage increases than workers with a third-level degree.
Figure 2 (right graph) illustrates the magnitude of the emigration wave between 2002 and
2006 for each skill group. Similarly to the wage changes, the emigrant shares were higher for
young workers than for old workers. Young workers were around 3.5 times more likely to emigrate
6 In 2004 the GDP in current prices was between EUR 4,800 (Lithuania) and EUR 6,300 (Slovakia), considerably
below the average of the old member states with EUR 26,000. Source: Eurostat.
7 See Table 1c.
5Figure 2 – Real Wage Changes and Emigrant Shares, Lithuania 2002-2006.
Note: The ﬁgure on the left shows the real wage changes in Lithuania from 2002 to 2006; the ﬁgure on the right displays the share of
emigrants per skill group. A skill group is deﬁned by education and work experience. Workers with 20 years and less of work experience
are deﬁned as young, those with 21 and more years as old. The real wages are deﬂated by the HCPI. The emigrant share is measured
as the share of the workers in a skill group that emigrated between 2002 and 2006.
Source: Own calculations from the Lithuanian HBS, the Irish Census and Work Permit Data. See Section 4 for details.
than old workers. Surprisingly, there was no visible selection of emigrants with respect to the
education groups. Workers of all three education levels had almost identical emigrant shares,
which is evidence against a brain drain.
Figure 3 – Wage Premia by Work Experience and Education.
Note: The ﬁgure on the left illustrates the development of the wage premium for old workers (i.e. workers more than 20 years of
experience) compared to young workers. The ﬁgure on the right shows the wage premium for college-educated workers (dashed line)
and for workers with an upper secondary education (solid line), compared to workers with a lower secondary education. Source: Own
calculations from the Lithuanian HBS.
The relative changes in real wages had a signiﬁcant impact on the wage inequality between
experience and education groups. In particular, the wage premium for old workers changed
remarkably, as the graph on the left in Figure 3 shows. In 2002 old workers earned on average 8%
more than young workers. This wage gap was reversed in 2006. The wage premium for workers
6with a third-level degree compared to those with a lower secondary education decreased slightly
over time, while the premium of workers with an upper secondary education remained stable. In
sum, the wage inequality between education groups decreased over time.
These changes in the level and the distribution of wages could be caused by numerous factors.
On the supply side, emigration leads to a smaller number of workers. Given constant labor
demand, the workers who did not emigrate are a more scarce resource and therefore their wages
increase. On the demand side, domestic and foreign investment, trade integration or TFP growth
can have a positive inﬂuence on wages.
The aim of this study is to isolate the role of emigration in the total change in wages, which
extends previous work by Elsner (2010) who found a positive average eﬀect in a reduced-form
approach. The current study goes a step further and investigates the impact of emigration on the
wage distribution. To that end, it aims to determine how much diﬀerent groups of workers gained
or lost from emigration, all other things equal.
3 Structural Model
The structural model explains how a change in labor supply aﬀects the wages of workers with
diﬀerent skills. To model this heterogeneity in observable skills, the workforce is divided into
12 skill groups, which are deﬁned by education and work experience. Workers with the same
observable characteristics are perfect substitutes and compete in the same labor market. Across
skill groups, workers with similar skills are closer substitutes than workers with fundamentally
diﬀerent skills. Emigration of workers of a particular skill group shifts the labor supply and, given
a downward-sloping labor demand curve, increases the wages of the stayers in this skill group.
In addition, emigration of workers from one group alters the relative skill supply of the entire
workforce, which shifts the labor demand curves of all other groups. The extent of these general
equilibrium eﬀects depends on the degree of substitutability between skill groups and needs to be
determined empirically.
Following the works of Card & Lemieux (2001), Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano & Peri (2011),
I model aggregate production in the economy with a nested CES production function, into which
each skill group enters as a distinct labor input. Assuming that labor markets clear and each skill
group is paid its marginal product, the model generates a relative labor demand curve for each
skill group. The model set-up allows for an econometric identiﬁcation of the labor demand curves
while accounting for heterogeneity in the skills of the workforce.
The aggregate production function consists of three building blocks: ﬁrst, physical capital
and labor are combined to produce an aggregate output. As this study focuses on a short-run
7eﬀect, capital is ﬁxed. The second building block is a CES aggregate of three education groups,
which reﬂects the fact that workers with diﬀerent education are imperfect substitutes in the labor
market. The third building block combines workers with the same education but diﬀerent work
experience, which accounts for the diﬀerence in skills between workers of diﬀerent experience
levels. On the one hand, the diﬀerence in skills can arise because old and young workers acquired
their qualiﬁcations at diﬀerent times. On the other hand, old workers may have gathered more
experience in their job, so that they have more human capital than younger workers.
3.1 Aggregate Production
The notation and analysis in this section closely follow Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano & Peri (2011).






Aggregate output Qt is produced using total factor productivity At, physical capital Kt and labor
Lt.  2 (0;1) is the share of labor in aggregate income. The price of the aggregate output is
normalized to one. The labor force Lt consists of three diﬀerent education groups Lit where i
denotes lower secondary education (10 years of schooling or less), upper secondary education (11-
14 years of schooling) and third-level degree (equivalent to B.Sc degree or higher). The aggregate












ED denotes the elasticity of substitution between workers of diﬀerent education groups. The
higher the value of this parameter, the easier it is to substitute groups of workers with diﬀerent
education in the production process. The relative productivity parameters it have the property
P
i it = 1 and capture the diﬀerence in relative productivity between education groups.












The elasticity of substitution EXP measures the degree of substitutability of workers with the
same education but diﬀerent work experience. ijt denotes the relative productivity of workers in
experience group j and education group i with
P
j ijt = 1.
8For the division of an education group into experience groups (j) I choose intervals of 10 years
of work experience (0-10 years, 11-20 years, 21-30 years, 31+ years). This choice is the result of
a trade-oﬀ between many skill groups and many observations per skill group, given the dataset.
Shorter intervals allow for a more diﬀerentiated picture of the labor market, but they come at the
cost of a loss in precision. With a given number of observations, a high number of skill groups
means that the calculation of the average wage and labor input per skill group are based on a
small number of observations. As a consequence, the averages become less precise. Aydemir &
Borjas (2011) show that this attenuation bias can have a signiﬁcant impact on the estimates of the
structural parameters. Given the available dataset, the choice of 10-year intervals is a compromise
that reduces attenuation bias and yet allows for a diﬀerentiated picture of the labor supply and
wage changes.8
Figure 4 – Nested CES Production Function
Note: This ﬁgure illustrates the nested structure of the CES production function, which is the core of the structural model. See Section
3 for details.
Figure 4 illustrates the nested structure of the aggregate production function. The model
compresses the diﬀerent degrees of substitutability between skill groups to 2 elasticities, ED and
EXP. This simpliﬁcation is necessary for the identiﬁcation of the structural parameters. Ideally,
one would like to estimate a separate relative labor demand curve for every skill group, but the
econometric identiﬁcation of the model would be impossible. With 12 skill groups the number
8 Most of the literature, e.g. Borjas (2003), Brücker & Jahn (2011), D’Amuri et al. (2010), Katz & Murphy
(1992), Manacorda et al. (2011), Ottaviano & Peri (2011) uses 5-year experience groups. In the estimation
results in Section 5.1 I also report results for 5-year and 20-year cells.
9of parameters to be estimated would amount to 12  11 = 132, which cannot be estimated from
the small number of observations that is typically available from aggregate labor market data.
Nevertheless, ED and EXP can be identiﬁed and given the variation in the number of emigrants
across skill groups, so that we can obtain a diﬀerentiated picture of the impact of emigration on
the wages of each skill group.
3.2 Labor Market Equilibrium
Labor markets are perfectly competitive and clear in every period. Proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms pay
each skill group Lijt a real wage wijt equal to the group’s marginal product wijt = @Qt=@Lijt.
This equation is the result of a partial diﬀerentiation of equations (1)-(3) and describes the ﬁrms’
labor demand for skill group ijt. The log of this equation yields a log-linear labor demand curve,
















EXP is the slope coeﬃcient, while all other terms on the right-hand side of equation (4)
are intercepts that vary along the dimensions indicated by the indices, i.e. time, education and
experience. Any change in one of the factors on the right-hand side alters the marginal product,
which leads to a change in the real wage ceteris paribus. Hence, the wage of group ij depends
on its own labor supply, as well as on the labor supply of all other groups of workers. Therefore,
it is not only the absolute scarcity of group ij which determines its wage, but also the relative
scarcity of this group compared to all other skill groups.
From equation (4), it is possible to generate an estimating equation for EXP, controlling
for all other factors that aﬀect the real wage. For the case of EU enlargment, these controls are
particularly important, as EU accession was accompanied by increased FDI inﬂows, a deeper trade
integration and the inﬂow of EU structural funds, which have an impact on labor demand and
ultimately on wages. Controlling for such factors is possible because the variation in all terms





can be absorbed by dummies
and interaction terms.

logAt + (1   )logKt + (   1 + 1
ED)logLt

only varies over time,
so that a set of time dummies t absorbs this variation. An interaction of time and education
group dummies it absorbs





, which varies across education groups
and over time. The parameters ijt and the labor input Lijt both vary along the dimensions
time, education and experience, so that the inclusion of an interaction of the respective dummies
10would absorb all the variation and the model would be fully saturated. In this case 1
EXP could
not be identiﬁed. To circumvent this problem, I assume that the relative productivity of each
experience group is constant over time, so that the variation of ijt is absorbed by an interaction
of education and experience dummies, ij and an error term "ijt. This is a standard assumption
in the literature9 and in the time horizon of 5 years it is plausible that the relative productivity of
an experience group does not change fundamentally. Moreover, as a robustness check in Section
5 I add an additional set of time*experience interaction terms to the estimating equation.
EXP can be consistently estimated from
logwijt = t + it + ij  
1
EXP
logLijt + "ijt: (5)
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis requires two datasets: one for the estimation of the structural parameters
that characterize the Lithuanian labor market and one for the quantiﬁcation of the number of
emigrants per skill group for the simulations. For the estimation of the structural parameters,
I use the Lithuanian Household Budget Survey of the 2 years before and after EU enlargement:
2002, 2003, 2005 and 2006.
The number of emigrants per skill group cannot be taken from the source country, as the
statistical oﬃces usually do not keep detailed records about emigrants. An obvious reason for this
lack of suitable emigration data is that in most European countries there is no legal obligation
for migrants to de-register once they have emigrated. The consideration of the case of Lithuanian
emigration after EU enlargement has the advantage that within the EU Lithuanians were only
allowed to migrate to the UK, Ireland and Sweden, while all other old EU countries kept their
labor markets closed for a transitional period up to 2011. Consequently, I can obtain the number
of emigrants from the register data of the destination countries. Since the numbers of migrants to
Sweden were relatively small10, I will neglect Sweden and only use census and work permit data
from Ireland and the UK.
4.1 Lithuanian Household Budget Survey
The Lithuanian Household Budget Survey (HBS) is conducted annually by the Lithuanian Sta-
tistical Oﬃce with a random sample of 7000-8000 households. The sample is representative at
9 See Borjas (2003), Ottaviano & Peri (2011).
10 See Wadensjö (2007).
11Table 1 – Summary Statistics Lithuanian HBS
a) Lithuanian HBS
Survey Year 2002 2003 2005 2006
Number All Workers 3950 4136 4042 3874
of Men 2322 2411 2426 2314
Workers Women 1628 1725 1616 1560
Education Lower Sec 348 431 435 384
Upper Sec 2726 2860 2733 2614
Third-level 876 844 874 876
Age 42.9 42.5 43.1 43.4
Experience 24.5 24.1 24.6 24.9
Real Wage All Workers 1084 1142 1339 1533
(monthly, in LTL) (799) (836) (954) (1093)
Men 1185 1152 1440 1688
(856) (913) (981) (1134)
Women 940 988 1189 1303
(684) (686) (890) (985)
Education Lower Sec 689 768 946 1045
(466) (545) (706) (707)
Upper Sec 952 1019 1203 1382
(619) (667) (784) (938)
Third-Level 1653 1752 1964 2197
(1076) (1129) (1203) (1351)
b) Irish Census
Number All Workers 1274 - - 11501
of Men 671 - - 6557
Workers Women 603 - - 4944
Education Lower Sec 211 - - 2315
Upper Sec 808 - - 7166
Third-level 255 - - 2020
Age 29.5 - - 30.7
c) Work Permit Data
NINo Numbers (UK) 1430 3140 10710 24200
PPS Numbers (Ireland) 2709 2394 18680 16017
d) Aggregate Data, Lithuania
Monthly Wage (in LTL) Men 1173 1227 1420 1676
Women 998 1029 1167 1356
HCPI 2005=100 97.334 96.291 100 103.788
Unemployment Rate 13.8% 12.4% 8.3% 5.6%
Note: Standard errors of average values in parentheses. HBS: Number of private sector workers between 18 and
64 years. Education groups and work experience are determined as described in Section 4. Real wages in Litas
(LTL) are deﬂated by the harmonized consumer price index (HCPI).
The Irish census was conducted in 2002 and 2006 only. Data from the Irish census contain all Lithuanian workers
who ﬁnished their education.
Sources: HBS and Irish census: Own calculations. Work permit data: UK Home Oﬃce, Irish Social Welfare
Oﬃce. Panel d): Statistics Lithuania.
12the individual level and includes all people aged 18 or older, for which information on their age,
education, income from employment, and personal characteristics such as marital status, number
of children and place of residence are available. The HBS does not contain information on the
sector the respondents are employed in or their occupation.
To obtain the monthly real wages I deﬂate the variable income from employment using the
harmonized consumer price index (HCPI).11 Table 1a displays the summary statistics for the
HBS. The average real wages increase for all groups between 2002 and 2006. The magnitude of
the standard errors of the average wages indicates a considerable variation of wages within each
skill group.
Income data are self-reported, which can be subject to a misreporting bias if workers system-
atically under- or over-report their income. However, a comparison of the average monthly wages
in Table 1a with the average monthly wages for men and women working in the private sector
from the Lithuanian live register in Table 1d shows that this bias is negligible, as the diﬀerence
between both is minor.
I restrict the sample to private sector workers of working age, i.e. 18-64 years and exclude
public sector workers from the sample, as wage determination in the public sector is usually not
based on the market mechanism of supply and demand, but on seniority. Additionally, I drop the
following observations: if the variable disposable income is negative, if the socioeconomic status
is pensioner or other, and if workers are self-employed or own a farm.
For each worker the highest obtained degree counts for her classiﬁcation into one of the
education groups lower secondary education, upper secondary education and third-level degree.
Lower secondary education includes all workers with less than a high school degree. Upper
secondary school classiﬁes all workers with a high school degree that allows them to go to college
as well as workers who obtained a degree that is less than the equivalent of a B.Sc degree. Third-
level degrees are all degrees that are at least equivalent to a B.Sc and would allow workers to
apply for an international M.Sc programme. Workers holding a degree Bakalauras, Magistras or
higher are classiﬁed as third-level educated.12 Those with some college education, but a degree
that requires less schooling than the two mentioned above are classiﬁed as having an upper
secondary education. This clustering may appear fairly broad, given that the Lithuanian education
system oﬀers a variety of educational tracks.13 However, these broad categories are necessary to
match the characteristics of the stayers with those of the emigrants. The HBS gives 12 education
groups, while the data on the emigrants only distingiushes between 5 groups. Furthermore, broad
11 See Table 1d for the HCPI.
12 These degrees are the minimum requirement for graduate admission at the London School of Economics
(LSE), see http://www2.lse.ac.uk/study/informationForInternationalStudents/countryRegion/europeEU/lithuania.aspx
13 See www.euroguidance.lt for a description of the Lithuanian education system.
13categories ensure that the number of observations within each group is large enough to allow for
the calculation of reliable average wages and emigration numbers.14
The HBS does not directly give any information about the actual work experience of an
individual. Therefore, I calculate the potential work experience of individual i with the formula
expi = agei   educationi   6, in which educationi represents the years of schooling it takes to
obtain individual i’s highest degree, agei is i’s age and 6 is subtracted because the compulsory
schooling age in Lithuania is 6 years. educationi equals 10 years for lower secondary education, 12
for upper secondary education and 15 for third-level degree. While this measure is appropriate for
men, a caveat applies for the use of the same formula for the calculation of the work experience
of women, who might have less actual work experience due to maternity leave. However, for
Lithuania the use of this formula for women should not be problematic. First, the country has
had low fertility rates of 1.5 children per women and less since the 1980s. Second, as is typical
for a former socialist country, women between 20 and 64 years have a high employment rate with
65%, compared to the EU average of 62%.15 Moreover, to overcome this potential problem of
misclassiﬁcation of women I use data on men only in a robustness check.
4.2 Irish Census
For the simulations, I use immigration data from the two main receiving countries, Ireland and
the UK. The Irish Census is conducted by the Irish Central Statistics Oﬃce (CSO) every 4-5 years
and contains all people living in Ireland and present on the night of the survey. For this study, I
use the survey rounds in 2002 and 2006. The CSO provided me with a tabulation of the number
of all Polish and Lithuanian immigrants in Ireland by gender, age and education.
The census reﬂects a lower bound to the number of emigrants, as it only captures migrants
who are present on the survey night. People who travelled to Ireland for a summer job or a time
shorter than one year may not be included in the census.
For the calculation of the number of emigrants I only use data on migrants whose education is
ﬁnished, which is 93% of Lithuanians in the census 2002 and 85% in 2006. As we can see in Table
1b the number of workers in the Irish census increased by a factor 10 between 2002 and 2006.
Interestingly, the educational distribution and the average age did not change signiﬁcantly over
time. The gender distribution of migrants in 2006 is slightly skewed towards men. Comparing
the Lithuanian migrants in the Irish census with the workers in Lithuania, we can see that the
education distribution is similar, although the migrants are on average 13 years younger than the
14 Table 8 in the appendix illustrates in detail the aggregation of the educational tracks into the three education
groups.
15 Source: Eurostat. Employment rates from 2009.
14stayers. In 2006 workers with a lower secondary education are slightly overrepresented among the
migrants (20% among migrants compared to 10% among stayers), while workers with a third-level
education are slightly underrepresented (18% among migrants compared to 23% among stayers).
These summary statistics indicate two types of selection behavior: migrants are more likely to be
young than stayers and on average less educated, although the extent of selection across education
groups is minor.
4.3 Work Permit Data: PPS and NINo Numbers
The number of workers who obtained a work permit in Ireland and the UK deﬁnes an upper
bound to migration from Lithuania to Ireland and the UK. Every worker who moves to Ireland
or the UK and wants to take up employment has to apply for a Personal Public Service (PPS)
number in Ireland or a National Insurance Number NINo in the UK.16 These data capture all
workers that emigrated from Lithuania to one of those two countries, regardless of how long
they stay in the host country. There is no obligation to de-register for workers in their home
country, so it is not possible to measure, how many people returned to Lithuania and how much
time they spent in the host country. Double counts are unlikely, however, as workers keep their
PPS and NINo numbers, no matter how often they move back and forth between Lithuania and
Ireland or between Lithuania and the UK. The PPS and NINo numbers could undercount the
actual number of migrant workers coming to Ireland and the UK, as some workers might not
have registered when they came to work for a short period in time or wanted to avoid having to
pay income taxes. Workers who only migrated for a short period in time and did not register for
that reason can hardly be seen as emigrants, because they were part of the Lithuanian workforce
for the whole time. Assessing the number of workers who migrated for a longer period without
registering is diﬃcult, but it should be small given the high number of migrants who actually did
register. In summary, even if the work permit data may slightly undercount the actual number
of migrants, for the simulations this means that the actual labor supply shock might be larger so
that the predicted wage changes resulting from emigration are lower than the actual ones.
4.4 Calculation of Emigration Rates
To simulate the eﬀect of the migration of diﬀerent skill groups on wages, the labor supply shock
Lij
Lij for each skill group has to be quantiﬁed. This fraction, which can be interpreted as the
emigration rate, i.e. the percentage of workers in skill group ij who emigrated, consists of the
change in labor supply in a given time span Lij and the number of workers of the same skill
16 For more information about PPS and NINo, see www.welfare.ie and www.direct.gov.uk
15group in Lithuania, Lij.17 Lij can be directly computed from the HBS. Let the sample of a skill
group ij contain l = 1;:::;L workers. The number of workers in this skill group is the sum of the




The shift in labor supply Lij cannot be taken directly from the data, but needs to be
computed from several Irish and UK data sources. This is due to the fact that I have detailed
data on Lithuanian migrants living in Ireland from the Irish census, but only aggregate ﬁgures
on the migrants coming to the UK.19 To compute the labor supply shifts, I assume that the
skill distribution of migrants coming to Ireland is the same as the distribution of those coming
to the UK. This assumption can be justiﬁed by the fact that there was little visible sorting
behavior of migrants from the New Member States between Ireland and the UK with respect
to age and education. There may have been a sorting behavior with respect to occupations, for
example immigrants in Ireland work more in the construction sector and immigrants in the UK
in the service sector but this study focuses on more broadly deﬁned skill groups, for which the
distribution is similar.
Figure 5 shows the education and age distribution of all migrants from the New Member
States in Ireland and the UK. The share of third-level educated workers was slightly higher in the
UK, while the share of workers with an upper secondary education was higher in Ireland. In the
youngest group, between 18 and 24 years of age, the UK saw relatively more immigrant workers
than Ireland. Consequently, the assumption that the experience distribution are the same implies
that the predicted wage changes for young workers can be slightly downward-biased, meaning
that the actual wage changes caused by emigration will be at least as high as those predicted by
the model.
Using the information from the UK and Irish data sources, the number of emigrants per skill
group ij is calculated as
Lij = (IEij;2006   IEij;2002)

1 +
Work permits in the UK 2002-2006
Work permits in Ireland 2002-2006

: (6)
(IEij;2006   IEij;2002) is the diﬀerence in the stock of Lithuanian immigrants in Ireland between
2002 and 2006 in skill group ij. The second expression in parentheses on the right-hand side of
17 Note that the supply shifts only consist of emigrants, but leave out migrants who came to Lithuania. As this
paper focuses on the impact of emigration and it is possible to isolate this eﬀect in the simulations, I do not
consider the potentially oﬀsetting wage impact of immigration.
18 Lij is the average value of Lijt in the years t = 2002;2003;2005;2006.
19 The UK labour force survey, the most accessible quarterly representative survey of the workforce in the UK,
cannot be used to extract reliable data on the skill distribution of a particular country, as the number of
observations per country is too small.
16Figure 5 – Education and Age Distribution of Immigrants from the New Member
States in the UK and Ireland
Source: Educational distribution as reported in Barrett & Duﬀy (2008)) for Ireland and Dustmann et al. (2010) for the UK. Age
distribution: own calculations from the Irish census (Lithuanian migrants only) for Ireland. UK distribution of all A8 immigrants from
Home Oﬃce, UK Border Agency (2009).
Table 2 – Emigration Rates 2002-2006
Education
Lower Sec Upper Sec Third-Level
0-10 Years 10.7% 14.4% 12%
Work 11-20 Years 5% 4.3% 2.9%
Experience 21-30 Years 5.8% 2.1% 2.6%
31+ Years 1.3% 1% 1.4%
Note: The emigration rate per skill group denotes the share of workers in every skill group who emigrated between
2002 and 2006. The average emigration rate, weighted by the size of the skill group, is 5%. The emigration rates
are calculated as the number of emigrants to Ireland and the UK divided by the average size of the skill group
between 2002 and 2006. Sources: own calculations, as explained in Section 4.4.
equation (6) augments the number of migrants to Ireland by a weighting factor that takes account
of the number of workers who migrated from Lithuania to the UK. The 1 accounts for those who
moved to Ireland and the fraction (Work permits in the UK 2002-2006)=(Work permits in Ireland 2002-2006)
is the number of work permits given to Lithuanians in the UK between 2002 and 2006 as measured
by the NINo numbers relative to the corresponding number in Ireland. Over the course of these
5 years 43% more Lithuanians received a work permit in the UK than in Ireland, so that the
fraction is 1:43.
Table 2 summarizes the calculated emigration rates per skill group and reveals the selection
pattern of emigrants along the old-young dimension. Most emigrants are young, with a work
experience of 10 years and less. Only very few older workers emigrated. Across education groups
the emigration rates were balanced, so that the country did not suﬀer from a brain drain. The
17aggregate emigration rate, weighted by the size of the skill groups in the Lithuanian workforce is
5%.
5 Estimation of Structural Parameters
5.1 Identification and Estimation of EXP
Using equation (5), I estimate EXP with the number of workers per skill group as a labor input
Lijt.20 An estimation of the demand curve with OLS does not yield consistent estimates as the
results suﬀer from simultaneity bias. The equation is a demand curve, but the observations in
the data are equilibrium points in the (wijt;Lijt) space, which were determined by an interplay
of supply and demand factors. To disentangle the labor demand and supply curves and identify
the slope of the demand curve, an exogenous labor supply shifter is needed that does not shift
labor demand, i.e. an instrumental variable (IV). Given an appropriate instrument, 1
EXP can be
consistently estimated with a two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) estimator.
Most of the literature, e.g. Borjas (2003), Aydemir & Borjas (2007), Ottaviano & Peri (2011),
uses immigration as an instrument for labor supply. For the current study, the corresponding
instrument would be emigration from Lithuania.21 To be valid as an instrument, it has to be
uncorrelated with labor demand over and above the correlation absorbed by the dummies and
interaction terms in the estimating equation (5). However, in light of the scale of the emigration
wave following EU enlargement, the emigration of workers of a speciﬁc skill group could also shift
the demand for workers in this particular group.
Take as an example computer programmers, who most likely have a third-level degree and
0-10 years of work experience. The emigration of a large number of programmers may have a
negative scale eﬀect on the productivity of their ﬁrms, which lowers the demand for programmers
that stay behind. Consequently, the emigration of workers in this skill group would be correlated
with the group’s labor demand, which makes emigration invalid as an instrument for labor supply.
To overcome the problem of identiﬁcation in the presence of simultaneity bias, I propose a
new instrument for labor supply, birth cohort size. This instrument follows the logic that the size
of a birth cohort should be highly correlated with labor supply today. For example, if 50 years ago
many people were born, we should observe many 50-year-olds in the workforce today. Obviously,
20 Ottaviano & Peri (2011) use the number of working hours from workers in this skill cell as a measure for labor
input, which is more accurate than the number of workers. However, as the HBS does not include data on
working hours, the number of workers serves as a proxy.
21 Immigration into Lithuania would be clearly invalid as an instrument, as it is very likely to be correlated with
labor demand in Lithuania.
18the size of a birth cohort is not a perfect predictor for the labor supply today, because it does not
take into account demographic factors like emigration, deaths or early retirement. However, as
long as birth cohort size is suﬃciently correlated with labor supply, it is suitable as an instrument.
To be valid as an instrument, the size of a birth cohort must not be correlated with labor
demand today, over and above the deterministic factors that are already controlled for in the
ﬁrst stage. In other words, the size of a birth cohort 50 years ago may well be correlated with
contemporaneous demand shifters such as physical capital or total factor productivity but these
correlations are absorbed in the ﬁrst stage with the time dummies t. The only possible violation
of the exclusion restriction would be an impact of the birth cohort size on the stochastic part of
the estimating equation, the error term "ijt. However, it is implausible that the size of a birth
cohort, which was determined many years ago, leads to a stochastic shift in labor demand today.
Note that the youngest cohort in the dataset is 18 years of age, the oldest 64. It appears unlikely
that the number of people born at least 18 years ago leads to a stochastic shift of the labor
demand curve today. This clear exogeneity of the birth cohort size makes it more suitable as an
instrument than emigration.
Figure 6 – Number of Births per Year in Lithuania.
Note: Total number of people born per year in Lithuania. Source: Statistics Lithuania.
The Lithuanian Statistical Oﬃce provides data on the total number of births per year from
1928 to 2010, excluding the years of the Second World war (1939-1945). Figure 6 shows the
number of births per year from 1945 to 1984, the years in which most workers in the sample
were born. As we can see there is a large variation in the number of births over time, which
can potentially be exploited in the IV regressions. The data in this time series are annual, while
the observations in the sample are skill groups that consist of 10 subsequent age cohorts, so that
the question arises, which measure predicts the number of workers of a skill group today most
19accurately. There are three candidates: 1) the total number of births, 2) the average number of
births and 3) the median number of births per skill group. Take as an example the skill group
upper secondary education, 0-10 years of work experience in the HBS of 2002. This skill group
consists of 11 birth cohorts, born between 1974 and 1984. The total number of births is the sum
over all the people born between 1974 and 1984, the average number of births is the average in
this time span and the median number of births is the corresponding median. Taking the average,
the sum or the median of the number of births ensures suﬃcient variation in the calculated size
of the birth cohort, since the time spans of the birth years of any two skill groups is diﬀerent and
so is the size of their birth cohort. As an example, consider workers with a work experience of
0-10 years in the HBS of 2002. Their birth years diﬀer depending on their education. Workers
with 0-10 years of work experience and a lower secondary education were born between 1976 and
1986, whereas those with a third-level degree were born ﬁve years earlier, between 1971 and 1981.
Consequently, despite the same level of work experience, the cohort sizes of these two groups
diﬀer.
The choice of the instrument depends on its statistical power, i.e. on the correlation of the
instrument with the endogenous regressor. As it turns out in the ﬁrst-stage regressions, the total
number and the average number of births are only weakly correlated with labor supply, so that
they cannot be used as instruments.22 The F-Statistic of the median number of births is 16:085,
which is a suﬃciently high correlation of the instrument with the endogenous regressor. The
reason for the weak correlation of the ﬁrst two instruments is their sensitivity to outliers in the
number of births. As we can see in Figure 6, the number of births was subject to high ﬂuctuations
and the sum and average are sensitive to large changes in the number of births. These jumps
dilute the ability of the instruments to predict the labor supply of a whole 10-year skill group.
The median is not sensitive to these jumps, so that it is a better predictor for labor supply.
Table 3 reports the estimation results for EXP. All regressions are weighted with sampling
weights.23 I report the OLS results for comparison but as previously explained, they are not
reliable because of simultaneity bias. The IV estimates lie consistently around  0:63, which
implies a EXP of 1:58.
The estimating equation (5) does not contain an interaction time*experience, which could bias
the results if the relative productivity of an experience group changes over time. This could be
an issue if there is a positive selection of emigrants within an experience group. If workers with
better unobservable characteristics leave, the remaining workers are on average less productive.
22 The F-Statistics are 0:358 for the average number of births and 0:212 for the total number of births.
23 A sampling weight is the inverse probability that an observation is included in the sample. The survey
contains sampling weights at the individual level. The sampling weight for each skill group is the sum of all
the sampling weights of this skill group.
20Table 3 – Regression results for EXP
Dependent variable: log real wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Method: OLS IV IV IV IV
Experience cells 10-year 10-year 10-year 20-year 5-year
log(Nr of Workers) -0.114 -0.631*** -0.680** -0.569*** -0.287
[0.0719] [0.1733] [0.2927] [0.161] [0.604]
Observations 48 48 48 24 96
R2 0.9742 0.9416 0.9440 0.9790 0.9466
F-Statistic 16.085 3.196 7.914 0.456
EXP 8.77 1.58 1.47 1.76 3.48
Controls:
t yes yes yes yes yes
it yes yes yes yes yes
ij yes yes yes yes yes
jt no no yes no no
Note: The table shows the estimation results for the elasticity of substitution between workers of diﬀerent experi-
ence groups, EXP (Equation 5), which is computed as the negative inverse of the coeﬃcients. Robust standard
errors in brackets. Signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: t: year dummies, it: interac-
tion year*education, ij interaction education*experience, jt: interaction experience*time. EXP is calculated as
the negative inverse of the estimated coeﬃcients.
21As column (3) in Table 3 shows, the point estimate does not diﬀer substantially from the baseline.
However, the instrument has less power due to the high degree of saturation.
To ensure that the results are not merely driven by the choice of the intervals of the experience
groups, I undertake the same analysis for 20-year and 5-year experience groups. In the case
of 20-year groups the dataset only consists of 2 experience groups in every survey year. The
estimated coeﬃcient is smaller in absolute value than in the benchmark model with 10-year
groups, which means that old and young workers can be seen as closer substitutes with this
speciﬁcation. However, the diﬀerence in absolute values of these coeﬃcients is not substantial. In
either of the two cases the labor demand curve is steeper than the one found in studies on the
US or Germany. In the case of 5-year experience groups the instruments have considerably less
power than in the case of 20 or 10-year groups. A reason for the weakness of the instrument can
be the high degree of noise in the data, caused by a small number of observations per skill group.
The estimates for EXP in the baseline scenario are lower in magnitude than those found in
previous studies that use a similar model for the United States, the UK and Germany. For the
US, the estimates range between 3.5 found by Borjas (2003) to 5 in Card & Lemieux (2001) to
7 in Ottaviano & Peri (2011). All these studies use data on 5-year experience groups, men only,
and diﬀerent rounds of the US census and Current Population Survey. Manacorda et al. (2011)
estimate a yet higher elasticity of around 10 for the UK, whereas the estimates for Germany in
D’Amuri et al. (2010) are lower with 3.1. The fact that the elasticities for Lithuania are lower than
any of those listed above means that workers with diﬀerent work experience are less substitutable
in Lithuania than they are in Germany, the UK or the United States. A smaller value is plausible
for two reasons. First, the above-mentioned studies estimate a long-run elasticity between skill
groups while I estimate a short-run elasticity. In the long run, workers of any age can adjust their
skills to changes in the labor market, which is not possible in the short run. As a consequence,
any two skill groups are closer substitutes in the long run than in the short run.
A second reason lies in the history of the country. As Lithuania was part of the Soviet Union
until 1990, older workers received their education and gathered their ﬁrst work experience in a
centrally planned economy, whereas younger workers were educated and grew up in the environ-
ment of a market economy. Consequently, the skills of young workers should be immediately
applicable to the labor market, whereas older workers may need some time for adjustment and
re-training, which can lead to a low degree of substitutability between old and young workers.
A recent paper by Brunello et al. (2011) backs this explanation. They show that in transition
countries men who were educated under socialism have lower returns to education than men who
were educated under a free market economy.
225.2 Identification and Estimation of ED
As a next step I estimate the elasticity of substitution between education groups ED.
The estimation equation for this parameter is derived in the same way as equation (5),
log  wit = t + it  
1
ED
log  Lit + "; (7)
in which t is a vector of year dummies and it is a vector of interactions between education and
year dummies.  wit is the average real wage paid to education group i at time t.  Lit is a labor
input calculated from the composite in equation (3).24
In theory, ED can be identiﬁed from equation (7). However, due to the small number of
observations, it is not possible to identify ED without imposing further restrictions. Otherwise,
the model would be too saturated and the coeﬃcient for  1=ED cannot be statistically distin-
guished from zero. The dataset consists of four survey rounds (2002, 2003, 2005, 2006) with
three education groups in each round, which results in a total of 12 observations, on which the
estimations of ED can be based.
To overcome this small sample problem I propose two solutions. First, to obtain a value for
ED or at least its order of magnitude, I estimate equation (7) with OLS, imposing restrictions
on the dummies and interaction terms. Second, in Appendix B I re-run the simulations of the
wage eﬀect using the very small and very large values for ED. Given that the large part of the
wage eﬀect is driven by the old-young dimension of the emigration wave and not by the selection
of emigrants across education groups, the choice ED has a relatively small impact on the results.
Table 4 shows the results of the OLS regressions. Surprisingly, in the ﬁrst 3 speciﬁcations,
the coeﬃcients are highly signiﬁcant. Only when ij is approximated by linear time trends, the
model is fully saturated and the coeﬃcient becomes insigniﬁcant. The point estimates of columns
(1)-(3) suggest an elasticity ED of 1:18. I will use this parameter for the baseline simulations.
Previous literature came to similar results for ED for US data. Krusell et al. (2000), as well as
Ciccone & Peri (2005) estimate a ED of 1:5, Borjas (2003) 1:3 and Card & Lemieux (2001) 2:25.
Compared to these results, the ED in this study is a short-run elasticity, which explains why it
is slightly smaller.
24 The ij are calculated from the coeﬃcients of the ij in equation (3) with ij = 11 as the base category, so










23Table 4 – OLS Results for ED
Dependent variable: log real wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log  Lit -0.85*** -0.85*** -0.85*** -0.155
[0.018] [0.010] [0.011] [0.145]
Time trend no yes no no
Year dummies no no yes no
Educ-speciﬁc no no no yes
time trend
Observations 12 12 12 12
Adj:R2 0.9954 0.9985 0.9981 0.9999
ED 1.18 1.18 1.18 8.69
Note: The table shows the estimation results for the elasticity of substitution between workers of diﬀerent education
groups, ED (Equation 7), which is calculated as the negative inverse of the estimated coeﬃcients. Robust standard
errors in brackets. Signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
6 Simulation of the Wage Effects
6.1 Simulation Equation
In this section, I simulate the emigration shock that occured after EU enlargement in this labor
market and calculate the new equilibrium wage for each skill group. The calculated wage change
is the diﬀerence between the equilibrium wages after and before the migration shock. The results
of this simulation have a ceteris paribus interpretation. The fundamental structure of the labor
market is held constant, so that the simulations yield the change in wages in absence of other
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Expressions Lt and Lit in equation (8) are labor aggregates and can as such be expressed in terms
25 At, , it and ij are held constant.
24of Lijt.26 The s measure the change in a variable from 2002 to 2006.
6.2 Model Calibration and Simulation Results
Figure 7 – The Impact of Emigration on Wages
Note: The ﬁgure displays the predicted wage changes, based on the simulation of the emigration wave after 2004
on the Lithuanian labor market. Parameters:  = 0:8, ED = 1:18. EXP = 1:58. Labels on the y-axis denote
education and work experience.
Figure 7 displays the simulated wage changes for the baseline scenario. A general pattern
emerges: emigration caused an increase in the wages of young workers, while the wages of old
workers decreased. Young workers gained between 4.9% and 7% from emigration. For workers
with a work experience between 10 and 30 years the model predicts wage changes close to zero.
Old workers with more than 30 years of work experience lost around 1% from emigration.
These results suggest that emigration had a signiﬁcant impact on the wage distribution be-
tween old and young workers. Because of the emigration wave after 2004, the youngest cohort
became signiﬁcantly smaller and this change in the composition of the workforce changed the wage
structure. As previously shown in Figure 3, the wage premium for older workers was reversed into













































the income share of education group i and sij denotes the income share of skill group ij. si and sij are
calculated from the sampling weights in the HBS using the information on all men and women in the sample.
25a wage penalty between 2002 and 2006. Emigration cannot entirely account for these changes in
the wage premium but the results give evidence that it played a signiﬁcant role.
To account for the uncertainty in the estimates of the structural parameters I calculate the
standard errors of the wage changes using Monte-Carlo simulations. The values of EXP and
ED are drawn independently from a normal distribution, 1
EXP  N(0:63;0:03) and 1
ED 
N(0:85;0:01).27 The simulated standard errors reported in Table 3 are the average standard
errors of 10000 replications. Comparing the calculated wage changes to the simulated standard
errors, we can see that most wage changes are statistically signiﬁcant at a signiﬁcance level of 5%
or lower. These simulated standard errors only take into account the uncertainty that arises from
the estimation of the structural parameters. The additional uncertainty given by the assumptions
about the number of migrants to the UK and the calculation of the labor aggregates are adressed
in the robustness checks in Section B.
Table 5 – Decomposition of the Wage Effect of Emigration
. Decomposition of Total Wage Change
Total (1) (2) (3) (4)
Education Experience Wage Standard Own- Cross- Scale Production
(Years) Change Error wage wage
Lower 0-10 4.89 0.93 6.76 1.15 -3.96 0.93
Secondary 11-20 1.23 0.08 3.10 1.15 -3.96 0.93
21-30 1.82 0.08 3.69 1.15 -3.96 0.93
31+ -1.07 0.72 0.80 1.15 -3.96 0.93
Upper 0-10 7.02 1.76 9.11 0.93 -3.96 0.93
Secondary 11-20 0.64 0.00 2.74 0.93 -3.96 0.93
21-30 -0.78 0.40 1.31 0.93 -3.96 0.93
31+ -1.43 0.58 0.66 0.93 -3.96 0.93
Third 0-10 5.72 1.19 7.62 1.13 -3.96 0.93
Level 11-20 -0.07 0.42 1.83 1.13 -3.96 0.93
21-30 -0.23 0.46 1.66 1.13 -3.96 0.93
31+ -1.01 0.68 0.88 1.13 -3.96 0.93
Note: All changes in %. Standard errors are determined by Monte Carlo simulations with 10000 replications for
the parameters ED and EXP. The total wage change can be decomposed in four eﬀects: 1) own-wage eﬀect, 2)
cross-wage eﬀect within an education group, 3) cross-wage eﬀect across education groups (complementarity eﬀect),
4) aggregate production eﬀect.
Although most of the predicted wage changes are statistically signiﬁcant, only the wage
changes for young workers are of economic signiﬁcance. This can be seen when we compare
27 Note that I take the inverse of the parameters, because these are the results of the IV regressions in Section
5.1.
26the simulated wage changes caused by migration with the total wages changes for Lithuanian
workers between 2002 and 2006 in Figure 2. The wages of all groups increased by between 20%
and 80%, so that emigration can explain between 10% and 30% of the wage changes of young
workers, but the wage changes of workers with a work experience higher than 10 years are driven
solely by other factors, such as domestic and foreign investment or productivity growth.
After noting that the predicted wage changes diﬀer considerably between young and old
workers, the question arises which factors drive these results within the model. Due to the nested
structure of the production function, there is a variety of channels through which a labor supply
shock can aﬀect wages. The total wage eﬀect in equation (8) can be decomposed into four eﬀects,
which are shown in Table 5. The ﬁrst eﬀect is referred to in the literature as the partial eﬀect
of migration on wages. The eﬀects 2, 3 and 4 are general equilibrium eﬀects that reﬂect the








. This eﬀect is a direct consequence of the supply shift. If
workers of skill group Lij emigrate, the stayers of this group become a more scarce resource,
which leads to an increase in their wages. As most emigrants were young, the own-wage
eﬀect is greatest for young workers.




Li . This wage change is
caused by a change in the size and composition of the labor aggregate of the worker’s educa-
tion group. For example, the emigration of young workers with a lower secondary education
increases the demand for older workers with a lower secondary education. Intuitively, the
positive sign follows the logic that workers with the same education are substitutes. How-
ever, as they are not perfect substitutes, the cross-wage eﬀect is smaller in absolute value
than the own-wage eﬀect.
3. Scale eﬀect 1
ED
L
L . The wage of each group of workers depends positively on the total
number of workers weighted by productivity. A decrease in the total number of workers will
therefore lead to a decrease in wages and this eﬀect is the same for all workers.
4. Aggregate Production Eﬀect  (1 )L
L . This eﬀect is a direct consequence of the func-
tional form of the aggregate production function. In a Cobb-Douglas production function,
a decrease in aggregate labor leads to an increase in output per worker, because output
decreases by less than aggregate labor. If capital were to adjust fully, this eﬀect would
disappear and the predicted wage changes would be about 1% lower.
Taking all these eﬀects together, we can draw the following conclusions: the post-EU-enlargement
emigration wave led to a substantial increase in the wages of young workers, as they have become a
27more scarce resource. The wage increase, caused by the own-wage eﬀect, outweighed the negative
aggregate production eﬀect. Older workers did not emigrate in large numbers but their wages
were aﬀected negatively by the scale eﬀect and the aggregate production eﬀect. Thinking about
the own-wage eﬀect as a supply eﬀect and the other 3 eﬀects as demand eﬀects, we can conclude
that for young workers the positive supply eﬀect exceeded the negative demand eﬀect, whereas
for old workers the negative demand eﬀect exceeded the supply eﬀect. Even though the CES
production function does in itself not account for complementarities between groups of workers,
the old-young distribution of migrants and the scale eﬀect lead to the same eﬀect as if old and
young workers were complements.
6.3 Comparison of the Structural Estimates with
Reduced-Form Results
It is important to note at this point that this study does not aim at explaining the change in real
wages in its entirety, but only the share of the wage changes that can be attributed to emigration.
This interpretation, identifying a causal eﬀect after controlling for all other explanatory variables,
is the same as for a reduced-form approach. To assess the quality of model predictions, one has
to compare the predicted wage changes from both approaches. The upper graph in Figure 8
compares the predicted wage changes from the structural model in this study to the estimates in
Elsner (2010). The latter are positive for every skill group, since the reduced form does not take
into account the complementarity eﬀects. Once the general equilibrium eﬀects are excluded from
the structural estimates, it turns out that the predictions of both approaches are almost identical,
as can be seen in the bottom graph of Figure 8.
This ﬁnding can have two interpretations. First, the reduced form identiﬁes a partial eﬀect and
does not account for complementarities between groups of workers. In this case, the reduced form
over-predicts the actual wage changes. Second, the general equilibrium eﬀects at higher nests of
the aggregate production function, i.e. the complementarity and the aggregate production eﬀect,
have no impact on wages, at least in the time span considered. In that case, the structural model
under-predicts the actual wage changes.
A third possibility is that the general equilibrium eﬀects show their eﬀect at diﬀerent times.
The simulation of the structural model is a counterfactual exercise which only considers two states
of the economy, before and after the shock. It is reasonable to think that the own-wage eﬀect has
a faster impact than the general equilibrium eﬀects, which are the consequences of adjustment of
the labor market through shifts in labor demand. In the 5-year period considered in this study
these eﬀects may not play a role in the wage determination yet, so that the wage changes predicted
28Figure 8 – Comparison: Structural Model vs. Reduced Form
Note: Labels on the y-axis denote education and work experience. The graphs display the causal impact of
emigration on wages, as predicted by the structural model and the reduced form. In the upper ﬁgure the impacts
on the highest nest of the CES production function, the complementarity eﬀect and the production eﬀect, are
excluded from the structural estimates. In the lower ﬁgure, these eﬀects are excluded.
by the reduced form and the structural model without complementarity and aggregate production
eﬀect are more accurate. In the long run, going beyond the considered period in time, the general
equilibrium eﬀects may come into eﬀect, which means that in the long run the predictions of the
structural model are more adequate.
29The structural model oﬀers insights in the channels through which emigration aﬀects the
wages of stayers, but it does so at the cost of the reliance on a number of assumptions. The
neoclassical demand framework presented in Section 3 is based on the assumption that labor
markets clear and thus assumes away unemployment and wage rigidities. These factors could
nevertheless play a role in the determination of wages, which would mean that the magnitude
of the wage eﬀects resulting from the simulations could be inaccurate. In fact, looking at Table
1d), we can see that the unemployment rate decreased substantially from 13.8% in 2002 to 5.6%
in 2006, which means that labor markets became tighter over the considered period. Given the
absence of information on the unemployment rate by skill group in the data, it is not possible to
incorporate unemployment into the simulations. However, in the reduced-form approach Elsner
(2010) controls for unemployment at the regional level and ﬁnds very similar results as in the
structural model in this study. This indicates that unemployment does not alter the magnitude
of the wage eﬀect of emigration.
6.4 Discussion of the Results
In the structural model I am able to decompose the eﬀect of emigration on wages and quantify the
contribution of its subcomponents. However, there may be a number of reasons why emigration
causes these wage changes in the real world that go beyond a story of a decrease in labor supply
and subsequent adjustments in labor demand.
One explanation why young workers gain from the possibility of emigration is the increase in
bargaining power. In 2004 workers in Central and Eastern Europe were granted the possibility
to emigrate at a very small cost. For stayers this means that they should be able to negotiate
higher wages under the threat of emigration. Before 2004 this threat was empty due to the high
emigration costs. The gain in bargaining power was lower for older workers, since they have higher
moving costs and their prospects of ﬁnding work in Ireland in the UK are considerably lower than
for young workers. Moreover, because of the large number of young emigrants the labor market
for young workers became tighter, which means that the same number of ﬁrms competes for fewer
workers. If the labor markets for old and young workers are very diﬀerent from each other, a
positive wage eﬀect should be visible among young workers but not among old workers. The
ﬁnding in Section 5 that young and old workers are less substitutable in Lithuania than in the
US or Germany conﬁrms this hypothesis.
Another explanation could be the sectoral distribution of workers. If young workers tend to
work in sectors with a high ﬂexibility of work contracts and a high ﬂuctuation of employees, they
are more likely to switch to a better-paid job once emigration leads to labor shortages in the sector.
30Figure 9 – Over-/under-epresentation of Workers Aged 14-34 by Occupation
Note: The graph displays the degree of over- or under-representation of workers aged 34 and less compared to
workers aged 35 and more. Source: 2002 Structure of Earnings Survey, conducted by Statistics Lithuania.
This possibility should be more likely in the service sector, which in Lithuania only evolved in the
last 15-20 years, and less likely in the manifacturing sector or in agriculture. If young workers
are concentrated in the service sector, they should see higher wage increases. The same logic also
applies to occupations. If young workers tend to choose occupations in which it is possible to
switch easily to a better-paid job, the wages of young workers should increase. Figure 9 gives
evidence for the concentration of young workers in certain groups of occupations. Workers aged
35 and less are over-represented in among service workers and technicians, while older workers are
more concentrated among legislators, senior oﬃcials and managers and elementary occupations,
which includes agriculure. These occupations tend to have a higher wage rigidity than occupations
related to services, so that the sectoral and occupational composition within an age group could
explain part of the wage changes for young workers.
7 Conclusion
This paper exploits the large and sudden emigration wave from Eastern Europe after EU en-
largement in 2004 to study how emigration aﬀects the wages of non-migrants. Using Lithuanian
microdata, I ﬁnd that emigration signiﬁcantly changed the wage distribution. Emigration caused
an increase in wages on average, but the wage eﬀect was concentrated among young workers,
31whose wages increased by around 6% over the period of 5 years, while the wages of older work-
ers were not aﬀected. Contrary to previous literature (Borjas, 2003; Aydemir & Borjas, 2007;
Docquier et al., 2011) I ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect of emigration on the wage distribution between
high-skilled and low-skilled workers. The diﬀerence in the wage eﬀects of diﬀerent experience
groups can be explained by the demographics of the emigration wave, which consisted mostly of
young workers from all education groups.
The quasi-experimental character of EU enlargement allows me to study an important issue
of immigration policy. Most high-income countries have strict immigration laws in place, which
restrict migration from low- and middle-income countries. Given the large wage diﬀerentials
between high-income countries and the rest, lifting these barriers to migration results in substantial
migration ﬂows, which have welfare impacts on both the sending and the receiving countries. The
"EU enlargement experiment" is a rare example for the lifting of migration restrictions. It shows
that workers in middle-income countries respond to the opening of labor markets in high-income
countries. Between 6 and 9% of the workforce of Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia emigrated
to the UK and Ireland. Moreover, the most mobile workers have higher emigration rates. Young
workers are typically more mobile and have lower moving costs than old workers. In this light, it
is not surprising that emigrants were on average 13 years younger than non-migrant workers in
Eastern Europe.
The results of this paper inform policymakers in middle-income countries about the labor
market impacts of the liberalization of migration. Many middle-income countries are in the same
situation as the Eastern European countries in 2004; they face a large wage diﬀerential and have
a well-educated and highly mobile workforce. Other examples are EU candidates like Croatia,
Serbia, or Turkey, which might see a similar outﬂow of workers as countries that joined the EU
in 2004.
The impact of migration on wages estimated here is larger than in most studies on the receiving
countries (Borjas, 2003; Ottaviano & Peri, 2011; Manacorda et al., 2011). Yet, the true winners
of migration are, in fact, the migrants themselves, who can on average earn 2.5 times as much in
the UK than in Eastern Europe.
32Table 6 – Regression results for EXP - Men only
Dependent variable: log real wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Method: OLS IV IV IV IV
Experience cells 10-year 10-year 10-year 20-year 5-year
log(Nr of Workers) -0.070 -0.573** -0.398* -0.570*** 0.198
[0.078] [0.241] [0.200] [0.192] [0.919]
Observations 48 48 48 24 96
R2 0.9727 0.9317 0.9626 0.9942 0.9326
F-Statistic 5.472 2.883 4.471 0.298
EXP 14.29 1.74 2.51 1.75 -5.05
Controls:
t yes yes yes yes yes
it yes yes yes yes yes
ij yes yes yes yes yes
jt no no yes no no
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: t: year
dummies, it: interaction year*education, ij interaction education*experience, jt: interaction experience*time.
EXP is calculated as the negative inverse of the estimated coeﬃcients.
A Estimation of EXP: Data on Men only
The baseline estimation in Section 5.1 assigns the same level of work experience to men and
women with the same age and education. This method can potentially lead to miscalculations
for the work experience of women, who might have less actual work experience due to maternity
leave. If this miscalculation was important, the results of the same regressions using data on men
only would have to diﬀer fundamentally from those with men and women. As we can see in Table
6, the results are diﬀerent when using data on men only, but not fundamentally. For 10-year
experience groups the estimated slope is slightly lower than in Table 3, 20-year it is the same. In
all cases the instruments are weaker than in the speciﬁcation with men and women, so that the
results in Table 3 are more accurately estimated.
B Sensitivity Analysis
The simulations in Section 6 were based on a number of assumptions about the structural param-
eters and the number of emigrants per skill group. In this section I check the robustness of the
simulation results to changes in these assumptions.
33In addition, I re-run the simulations using parameter values from the literature. The structural
parameters of the Lithuanian labor market are fundamentally diﬀerent from those found in the
literature for industrialized countries such as Germany and the US. This diﬀerence is not suprising,
given that Lithuania is a transition country. The calibration of the model on parameters from
the literature may answer another interesting question: suppose Lithuania had the labor market
of Germany or the US, what would be the wage changes resulting from the emigration wave after
2004?
B.1 Variation in ED
Due to the high level of aggregation and the resulting low number of observations in the data, the
identiﬁcation of ED is subject to great uncertainty. However, as the selection of migrants took
place along the old-young dimension, the results are robust to changes in ED, even in cases when
this parameter takes on extreme values. Columns (2) and (3) in Table 7 show the simulation
results for ED = 1 (Cobb-Douglas case) and for ED = 1, for which any two education groups
are perfect substitutes. The predicted wage changes only vary mildly with the variation in ED.
B.2 Irish data only
The calculation of the number of emigrants per skill group was based on the assumption that the
distribution of Lithuanian migrants in Ireland is the same as in the UK. I based this assumption
on previous studies, from which it can be seen that the educational distribution of migrants from
the New Member States was approximately the same. However, there is some uncertainty about
the joint education-experience distribution of Lithuanian migrants in Ireland. If, for example,
relatively more younger workers went to the UK than to Ireland, the simulation results from the
previous section would understate the impact of migration on real wages. Therefore, I re-run the
simulations of Section 6 with Irish data only. Column (2) in Table 7 shows the simulated wage
changes based on Irish data only. Compared to the baseline scenario, the magnitude of the wage
eﬀects is signiﬁcantly lower, but the pattern prevails: young workers gain from emigration, while
old workers lose. As the emigration rates taken from the Irish census data reﬂect a lower bound
to emigration from Lithuania, the true wage eﬀects from emigration will be at least as large as
those based on simulations with Irish data only.
34B.3 Calibration on Parameters from the Literature
In this section I calibrate the model on parameters that were obtained in the literature for the
US, the UK and Germany.
Table 7 compares the baseline results with the results when the model is calibrated on pa-
rameters from the literature. As the labor demand curves in Lithuania are steeper, the ﬁrst-order
eﬀects, i.e. the direct impact of a labor supply shift of a skill group on the wage of the same group,
are greater with the parameter estimated for the Lithuanian labor market. On the other hand,
the fact that ED found here is smaller than the one in the literature means that the higher-order
eﬀects, i.e. the eﬀects of the labor supply shifts of workers from one skill group on the wages of
another skill group, are smaller in the Lithuanian case. Consequently, the negative wage eﬀects I
ﬁnd for workers with more than 30 years of work experience disappear when calibrating the model
on parameters from other studies. Despite the diﬀerent magnitude in the wage changes, the main



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36C Tables and Figures
Table 8 – Aggregation of Education Groups in the Lithuanian HBS and the Irish
Census.
This study HBS 2002 HBS 2003-2006 Irish Census
lower under primary (1) vocational school after basic (7) primary school and less,
secondary primary (2) vocational school after primary (8) lower secondary school,
education basic (3) basic school (9)
duration: 10 years primary school (10)
leaving age: 16 literacy skills, but no education (11)
illiterate(12)
upper secondary (4) professional college and college (2) upper secondary education,
secondary specialized secondary school (3) third-level
education secondary school (4) (but no B.Sc equivalent)
duration: 12 years vocational school (after secondary) (5)
leaving age: 18 vocational school (after basic) (6)
third- third-level (5) university (1) third-level




Note: If applicable, variable code of the original dataset in parentheses.
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